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1 Introduction
There is currently much talk of the role of the
‘rising powers’ and ‘emerging donors’ in Africa,
and whether this presents a ‘new paradigm’ in
development cooperation (Mawdsley 2012;
Brautigam 2009; Alden 2007). The BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
grouping of countries recently met in Durban to
discuss new approaches to development, and
committed to the launch of a BRICS
development bank.1 New aid relations, centred
on a new global geopolitics, and ushering in new
South–South cooperation, were celebrated.
Such discussions also featured prominently in
the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
(HLF4), held in South Korea at the end of 2011,
an event that will be remembered as the first
time traditional and non-traditional donors2 sat
together, as providers of development
cooperation, to agree on best practices for
delivering assistance to poor countries. Although
the Forum did not produce universal standards
on aid effectiveness, but rather differential
commitments for traditional and non-traditional
donors, it reflected the world’s ‘shifting
geopolitical realities’ (Glennie 2011) by
recognising the increasingly significant role
played by South–South cooperation and the need
to move beyond the narrow focus on aid and
consider development finance more broadly.
Whether these new players offer a ‘new
paradigm’ (Woods 2008), in contrast to the
conventional OECD-DAC countries’ approach, is
open to question, of course. Beyond the
rhetorical claims by either side, we need to dig
deeper into the actual practices of aid
development assistance, trade and investment to
see what is new and different, and what is not.
The presence of the rising powers in Africa has
been the focus of much attention and a great deal
of negative reporting, although a more nuanced
and balanced view is now emerging, as research
on the topic builds up. Most analysis focuses on
China (Africa Research Institute 2012; Alden and
Chichava 2012; Brautigam 2009; Rotberg 2008;
Alden 2007), while a thorough review of the
experience of other rising powers like Brazil is
still in short supply. Furthermore, much recent
work on ‘the BRICS in Africa’ has emphasised
the macro-geopolitical dimensions, as these new
players engage in areas dominated in the past by
Western donors and companies. This often gives a
very general, aggregate picture focusing on the
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broad patterns of aid, trade and development
finance, with relatively little examination of the
emerging relationships in particular sectoral
areas, including agriculture (although see
Brautigam 2009).
African agricultural policymakers are
increasingly looking to the BRICS countries not
only as investors and suppliers of technology, but
also as sources of examples to be emulated,
whether in large-scale commercial farming or in
mass mobilisation to boost smallholder
productivity. Well-established cooperation links
have long supported a flow of African
agricultural development specialists to Brasília,
Delhi or Beijing. However, this flow has
accelerated dramatically in recent years as the
BRICS – and their supporters within the global
agriculture policy community – intensify their
efforts to promote their agricultural
development ‘models’ as holding the key to
unlocking Africa’s agricultural potential.
But what are the realities that lie behind these
‘models’ within the BRICS countries themselves?
What domestic political economy drivers lie
behind new international policies aimed at
exporting them? What is the political economy of
this new engagement in African settings, coming
as it does on long histories of colonial and post-
colonial development intervention? How should
Africa approach these new engagements: with
open arms, or with sceptical caution?
This IDS Bulletin hopes to begin to answer these
questions, by focusing on both China and Brazil
and developing a comparative insight into the
different modalities, practices and politics of
engagement by these two ‘rising powers’ in
African agriculture. By looking at different
country experiences – in Ethiopia, Ghana,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe – we can get an
insight into the country-level dynamics at play. By
concentrating on agriculture – and looking at a
range of interventions including training,
technology transfer, concessional lending and
corporate investment – we can begin to get an
insight into the diverse forms that this new form
of ‘development cooperation’ takes in a strategic
sector. By considering Brazil and China’s own
domestic experiences of agricultural
development, we can also better understand the
genesis of the ‘models’ on offer, and assess the
potential for their adaptation to African contexts.
2 Four country cases
Our four African country cases offer interesting
and contrasting insights. Ghana has recently
risen to the status of a ‘middle-income’ country
with impressive economic growth, supported by a
strong mining sector and recent petroleum
discoveries. In the context of economic
liberalisation since the 1980s, there has been
long-standing government support for
international agri-business and agri-business
linkages with smallholders engaged in export
production. In-flows of foreign capital into the
agricultural sector have seen certain export-
based agricultural commodities boom in recent
years, with a number of both local and
multinational agri-businesses reaping the profits
(Amanor, this IDS Bulletin).
Ethiopia has also seen impressive economic
growth figures in recent years, but from a low
base, and with still extreme poverty dominating.
However, again, agriculture has been important,
with the growth of commercial floriculture, for
example, having been a major success story, at
least in terms of aggregate growth statistics
(Kelsall 2013). Ethiopia has not followed the
standard model of neoliberal reform however,
and instead has followed a more state-directed
strategy, mobilising state-controlled private
sector and government support in favour of
focused investments, including large-scale land
deals (Lavers 2012). A developmental state is
envisaged, modelled on the East Asian
experience, with external investment being
carefully channelled and controlled (Alemu and
Scoones, this IDS Bulletin).
Mozambique again has seen impressive economic
growth, backed in particular by mining and
aluminium smelting, but also with growth in
some agricultural commodities. The government
argues that there is massive underutilisation of
land in the country and real potential for
commercial expansion. Attracting foreign
investment in all sectors has been a priority, and
has been managed by a political elite eager to
benefit (cf Burr et al. 2011; do Rosário 2012).
Western donor aid has played its part, offering
budget support to the central exchequer for a
poverty reduction-focused policy framework,
while at the same time pushing for market
liberalisation. But, as government leadership
becomes more assertive and state intervention in
agriculture regains favour, relations with Western
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donors have become less amicable, making the
‘rising powers’ increasingly appealing partners
for a growth-oriented, state-led development
model (Chichava et al., this IDS Bulletin).
Zimbabwe has seen a rapid economic recovery
since the formation of the Government of
National Unity in 2009, and the stabilisation of
the economy. However, the country suffered
extreme economic collapse during the 2000s, and
had to manage the consequences of economic
and diplomatic sanctions from Western
countries. With the withdrawal of aid, and
perhaps more significantly international credit
lines, the government was forced to seek
alternative assistance as part of its ‘Look East’
policy. China provided substantial support, and
through connections in all sectors, most notably
mining, but also agriculture, has become deeply
involved at the core of Zimbabwe’s economy.
With the radical land reform of 2000,
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector was completely
reconfigured, and new forms of support were
required for the 150,000 new farm households in
land reform areas. Again, with Western donors
continuing to object to the land reform, the
government sought assistance from elsewhere,
and deals with both Brazil (for tractors) and
China (for tobacco) have been struck. The
commercial support to tobacco outgrowing from
the Chinese company, Tian Ze, has assisted with
a massive and rapid turnaround in this key
commodity, with new farmers being significant
producers, contributing substantially to the
export economy (Mukwereza, this IDS Bulletin).
Thus, across the four countries we can see
different forms of engagement by China and
Brazil, depending on the context, needs and
priorities. In this IDS Bulletin we examine a range
of ‘development encounters’ which take place
under the umbrella of ‘development cooperation’;
a term that allows a broader definition than that
simply ascribed to ‘aid’ or ‘official development
assistance’ under OECD-DAC definitions. The
articles that follow offer insights into the
motivations, interests and political positioning of
the huge diversity of actors involved in such
development encounters. These can include
technical cooperation, in-kind donations,
monetary grants, concessional lending, as well as
personnel exchanges and investment, all set in
the context of broader diplomatic as well as
economic interactions. As we show below, both
China and Brazil use broad definitions of
‘cooperation’ and reject being labelled as donors,
preferring to be instead portrayed as partners in
a horizontal and mutually beneficial relationship.
Exactly how such engagements are framed and by
whom, and what narratives and practices define
these interventions is the focus of the section that
follows.
3 Narratives and practices of engagement
There are perhaps two main and highly
contrasting narratives that frame the way the
‘rising powers’ are seen in relation to Africa
(cf Alden 2007).
The first is the view that these new engagements
reflect a new form of colonialism, centred on
rapacious resource grabs, with tied aid linked to
the expansion of commercial opportunities for
the rising powers. These aid, trade and
investment agreements in turn fuel debt and
create dependencies, resulting in the exploitation
of weak African states, unable to negotiate better
terms. Despite the high-sounding rhetoric, Africa,
yet again, is being used to provide resources to
growing economies elsewhere in a ‘sub-imperial’
relationship (Bond 2013), and receives limited
benefits, beyond those often appropriated by
elites through corrupt practices.
The second narrative offers a more positive
perspective. This sees the new development
cooperation paradigm offering new forms and
styles of partnership, centred on sharing and
mutual benefit, framed by a vision of
South–South cooperation and solidarity. Africa, it
is argued, can learn from the experiences of
China, Brazil, India and others, as these
countries have recently transformed into
growing economies with reduced poverty levels.
This vision therefore recasts the old post-colonial
aid relationships which have held Africa back,
and so moves beyond the policy-based
conditionalities that have restricted African
development in the past decades.
The ‘new coloniser’ and ‘South–South
partnership’ narratives of course are gross
simplifications. Neither hold up to careful
scrutiny in practice, but both are deployed at
different times by different actors to support
particular stances and actions. There are of
course many shades of grey between such stark
positions, and potential alternative framings that
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do not get such exposure. Some indeed question
all the fuss being made, and suggest that, in
terms of overall importance, development
cooperation relationships with the ‘rising powers’
are small, and they will soon be aligned with
those of existing donors and investment
partners, as part of overarching global
agreements and coordination mechanisms.
This IDS Bulletin illustrates that, while offering
rhetorical power and gaining some purchase in
wider debates, simple overarching narratives are
highly debatable. On the one hand, there is no
single Chinese, Brazilian or African position.
China and Brazil, for example, have very
different interests and priorities, and within
these countries there are intense contests
between different approaches, reflecting
domestic political dynamics. On the other hand,
Africa’s 55 countries are hugely diverse, and any
new development encounter arrives on the back
of a very complex agrarian history and political
economy. For example, the dominance of a
smallholder sector or the possibilities of
extending large-scale commercial agriculture will
depend on histories of colonial expropriation,
tenure regimes and land control, as well as
government policies. Thus, depending on the
context, arguably similar interventions – whether
a commercial agricultural scheme or a technical
training – will have very different consequences.
This IDS Bulletin is the first major output of a new
project – China and Brazil in African Agriculture
(CBAA) – funded by the UK’s Economic and
Social Research Council and part of the Future
Agricultures Consortium’s (FAC) programme of
work.3 Building on a mapping exercise, looking at
what is going on where, our work focuses on the
interactions that occur in particular aid and
investment projects. All such engagements occur
through negotiation, and are played out in
practice through everyday interactions in projects,
in businesses, in planning meetings and so on.
Our work is interested in these ‘knowledge
encounters’, where different cultural assumptions,
forms of expertise and experience are confronted.
From the colonial era, and through the post-
colonial development encounter, African
policymakers and technical experts have learned
to negotiate around issues of technology transfer,
economic reform or loan agreements. It is not as if
‘Africa’ is a passive recipient of such intervention:
agency is expressed, often very effectively through
combinations of assertive positioning and more
hidden resistance. The form this takes, as the
cases presented in this IDS Bulletin show, is
enormously variable.
The same applies to these new encounters. But
with new players, carrying with them different
discourses and practices, rooted in their own
recent development experiences, new learning
has to take place, and the room for manoeuvre by
African states is potentially increased
(Kragelund 2008). Different players can be
traded off against each other, depending on what
is on offer, and the conditions attached. Both
China and Brazil, at different times and through
different routes, promote smallholder and large-
scale agriculture, both offer support for
infrastructural development and financing, and
both are eager to see their own companies
engage in African agriculture. Traditional
Western donors, while couching their aid
programmes in humanitarian objectives, are also
keen to promote their own agri-business
enterprises, technological options and value
chains. While there are clear commonalities in
the operation of globalised capital, and its
support by states, from whatever provenance, the
degree to which options are controlled, for
example through intellectual property regimes,
varies. Thus, depending on the form of
engagement, opportunities for negotiation and
the development of locally attuned solutions also
differ.
Thus to understand these new encounters in
development cooperation, we have to get to grips
with the macro-narratives and how they are
deployed and to what purpose, as well as the
micro-dynamics on the ground. We must
therefore consider the cultural, social and
political relations at play, as well as the wider
political economy that structures such
engagements, asking whose interests are being
served, and who wins and who loses.
4 Investing in agriculture
Why then the focus on agriculture? Both China
and Brazil have identified agriculture as central
to their new development cooperation efforts in
Africa. A number of rationales are presented,
both explicitly and implicitly.
First is the availability of agricultural land.
Africa is seen – often highly inaccurately – as a
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continent where land is plentiful, and open for
more intensive use. The ‘idle’ or ‘underutilised’
land discourse has framed much of the current
interest in large-scale commercial land
investments in Africa (sometimes dubbed ‘land
grabs’) (Nalepa and Bauer 2012), with the World
Bank identifying particular countries which are
deemed to have land surplus, with sufficient
productive land (Deininger et al. 2011). Yet too
often such assessments forget the fact that land
is used, and held by different groups, even if not
for agricultural production, and so is not ‘free’ or
‘available’ for investment (White et al. 2012). Yet,
by comparison to some countries, land resources
are available, soils are good and the tropical
climate ideal for agriculture, and so, with the
assistance and encouragement of national
governments such areas are being targeted to
supply food, fuel or feed. The extent of such land
investments however is much disputed, and
despite the large numbers sometimes quoted,
the actual amount of land being acquired for
land investments by rising powers is relatively
modest (Scoones et al. forthcoming).
Second is the ecological dimension. Here the
argument centres on the claim that African
agroecologies are similar to those elsewhere at
similar latitudes, and therefore transfer of
technologies or agronomic practices should be
easy. This argument is prominent in Brazilian
cooperation discourse. The imagery is clear: an
ecological similarity allows for a linear transfer,
and an extension of the Brazilian success story in
taming and transforming a challenging ecology
into productive agriculture for Africa. For
example, the much celebrated transformation of
the Brazilian Cerrado through a combination of
soil management techniques and mechanised
agriculture (Hosono and Hongo 2012) is seen as
a model for the ‘Guinea savanna’ zone of Africa,
which, through a liberal interpretation of the
similarities, the World Bank argues stretches in a
huge arc from West to East to Southern Africa
(Morris and Larson 2009).
Third is the business dimension, where the
argument is made that Africa holds a unique
comparative advantage, with cheap, available
land, low labour costs and relatively good access
to markets. Infrastructure investments –
corridors, roads, ports and so on – must go with
any agricultural investment to ensure maximum
market advantage and lowering of transport
costs. But in the long run, even in the currently
more remote parts of the continent, African
economic advantages are seen in contrast to the
distant frontiers of the Amazon in Brazil or the
further reaches of China. This argument is made
even more pertinent, given the growing demand
for agricultural produce within Africa. Africa’s
economic growth has been much commented
upon (The Economist 2013). While driven by
commodity booms, including in land and
agricultural products, but also of course in
minerals (Morris et al. 2011), it is fuelling
demand, which is reinforced by a process of
urbanisation, and a growing middle class
(although see Potts 2012). The market
advantages of agricultural investments in Africa
are also increased when the preferential trade
deals, with Europe in particular but also North
America, are taken into account. Restrictions on
Brazilian imports, for example, in European and
North American markets can be got round
through investment in Africa, it is argued
(Amanor, this IDS Bulletin).
Fourth is the emergence of a new dualism in
agriculture, and an emphasis on large-scale
agriculture (Collier 2008). As the cases in this IDS
Bulletin show, many African governments have
revived an emphasis on large-scale, mechanised
agriculture to promote growth, particularly in
foreign exchange generating exports, largely
dropped from policy agendas since the 1970s with
the failure of large-scale state farms. Large-scale
farms have not been a focus of support by Western
donors in the last decades, except in the context
of outgrower schemes and value chain
development (Kirsten and Sartorius 2002).
Indeed, agriculture was largely ignored as part of
such aid programmes for over 20 years; although
when it tentatively returned in the mid-2000s, the
emphasis has mostly been on smallholder
agriculture, through pan-African initiatives such
as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
(AGRA) and the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).4
Yet, despite such efforts, smallholder farming has
increasingly lost its political and economic
prominence in many contexts. In addition to
policy neglect, this was assisted by the
conditionalities of structural adjustment that
opened up markets, privatised parastatals and
agricultural services and facilitated the creation of
regulations that limited market participation,
allowing agri-business in Africa to gain greater
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influence (Amanor 2005). The experiences of
Brazil and China in large-scale, mechanised
agriculture are therefore of much interest to
African governments and business elites, especially
if support comes with private investment, soft
loans, transfers of high-end equipment and
technical support; aspects largely absent in most
Western aid programmes in recent years.
Finally is the emphasis on aspects of investment
beyond agriculture. To get agriculture moving
requires a wider investment in infrastructure,
financing, research and capacity. Again, with the
tight conditionalities and the narrow focus of most
Western aid programmes, such investments have
diminished. Structural adjustment programmes
from the 1980s devastated state capacities in
agricultural research and extension, and the basic
support infrastructure in most African countries is
very weak (Scoones et al. 2005). Although
supported by still reasonably well-funded
international research, through the CGIAR
(Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research) and alliances with NGOs
and others, national capacities are limited. The
same applies to infrastructural investments
which, although some support through the World
Bank, the African Development Bank and others
is flowing towards large-scale ‘growth corridor’
initiatives, the overall levels remain small in
relation to need. Financing equally remains tied
to tight conditionalities, making the China Exim
Bank loans (Export-Import Bank of China) very
attractive to cash-strapped governments. Thus,
offers of support from the likes of China and
Brazil are often enthusiastically embraced, and
seen as complementing the support of Western
donors in important ways, and allowing finance
and technical support to come behind ambitious
growth-oriented agricultural strategies.
Across these five dimensions, agriculture is seen
as a major priority for aid, trade and investment
in Africa by China and Brazil, although in
different ways, and with different rationales. But
to understand Chinese and Brazilian
engagements in agriculture in Africa more
completely, we also need to appreciate how
development cooperation in agriculture is seen
from Chinese and Brazilian standpoints, and how
this is framed by domestic economic and political
considerations. The following two sections offer a
brief overview, before we outline some of the
themes that define such engagements.
5 China in Africa
China has long had engagements in Africa, with
development-focused interactions dating back to
the 1960s, and engagements in trade and politics
dating back much earlier (Tan-Mullins et al. 2010;
Large 2008; McCormick 2008; Mohan and Power
2008; Alden 2007). Since the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), its earliest
relationships were conditioned by political
solidarity with African states in the period
leading up to and immediately after
independence. As a counter to what were seen as
Western imperial interventions or the alliances
struck by the Soviet Union, Chinese relations
were very much tied up with a rhetoric of socialist
solidarity and alliances with liberation
movements, many of whom became the ruling
parties of newly independent nations (Ismael
1971). Prestige projects such as the Tazara
railway from Lusaka to Dar es Salaam became
the hallmark of such engagements (Yu 1980), and
Zhou Enlai’s landmark speech in Ghana in 1963
spoke of the eight principles of Chinese aid that
were to set it apart from traditional donors
thereafter (Brautigam 2009). These included
equality, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty
and many of the other elements that remain a
part of China’s cooperation programmes today.
Although most early engagements focused on
infrastructure and the placement of experts,
agricultural development programmes formed
an important bargaining chip offered by both the
PRC and Taiwan in their political jostling for
diplomatic recognition in Africa (Brautigam
1998, 2009). Even after the PRC had won
Taiwan’s UN representation and seat on the
permanent security council in 1971, their
agricultural programmes continued to compete
with Taiwan’s equivalent, named ‘Operation
Vanguard’, until the late 1990s (Brautigam and
Tang 2009). A number of states fluctuated back
and forth in the 1980s and 1990s, but by the
early 2000s, most countries in Africa had
established diplomatic relations with the PRC,
with the only four states still outstanding in 2013
(Burkina Faso, Gambia, São Tomé e Príncipe and
Swaziland). The PRC’s new, firmer relationships
with Africa were enshrined with the first
meeting of the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000.
As bilateral trade between China and Africa has
grown substantially since the 1990s (Kaplinsky
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and Morris 2009b), new engagements have also
been sought (Power and Mohan 2010; Tull 2006).
A significant part of this has focused on ‘resource
diplomacy’ (Power et al. 2012; Carmody et al.
2012; Carmody and Taylor 2010), given China’s
increased demand for natural resources to fuel
its growing economy. This has resulted in
sometimes uneasy alliances, but also important
accommodations (Corkin 2011a). In 2012, Sino-
African trade reached its highest levels yet, at
almost US$200 billion according to official
Chinese sources (Yang 2013). This trade derives
partly from the movement of many Chinese
entrepreneurs to Africa, creating a huge and
influential network of traders in the Chinese
diaspora (Park 2010; Mohan and Tan-Mullins
2009; Brautigam 2003), as well as African traders
going to China. In addition, there are substantial
investments by Chinese companies, often linked
to particular Chinese regions (MOFCOM 2012;
Gu 2009). Such quasi-private companies are
heavily supported by the Chinese state, in
financial, political and logistical terms.
Jakobson (2009) provides a classification of
Chinese actors, including: officials representing
the Chinese state, government departments and
the state-owned Export-Import Bank of China;
large, successful companies, whether state-
operated or privately owned; small and medium
enterprises; well-connected ‘middle-men’,
including private businessmen and diaspora
traders; and Chinese migrant labourers.
Increasingly these include actors interested in
agriculture, including agri-processing (see Amanor
on Ghana, this IDS Bulletin) and larger-scale
production operations (Chichava et al. on
Mozambique, this IDS Bulletin), as well as smaller-
scale operations run by the Chinese diaspora.
The role of Chinese financing, across sectors, has
been particularly important. China is awash with
surplus capital, and needs to diversify away from
US dollar holdings. This has encouraged
investment in fixed capital, including major
infrastructure investments in Africa through the
China Development Bank. Such commercial
loans can also be complemented by 20–30-year
concessional loans from the Export-Import Bank
of China. This is a state-financed concessional
programme, with a development cooperation
mandate, and with strong links to the powerful
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Exim bank
loans have provided important and growing
finance to Africa, with relatively few strings
attached; at least compared to commercial or
Western-controlled development banks (Grimm
et al. 2011; Corkin 2011b). While fears exist that
such loans will create a new phase of
indebtedness in Africa, if used strategically and
flexibly African policymakers argue that they
have been essential in providing finance in key
areas, allowing recovery and growth.
While China does not talk of development ‘aid’,
there is a distinct area of development
cooperation which represents direct government-
to-government transfer of resources governed by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and
often discussed within FOCAC. This high-level
forum has provided an important political space
for Chinese–African relationships, starting in
2000 with a major event in Beijing, and being
followed by four summits since then, every three
years. An increasing number of high-level
diplomatic exchanges have occurred too, most
notably including the new Chinese president’s
visit to three African countries on his first trip
abroad as head of state (March 2013).5 As Lila
Buckley (this IDS Bulletin) explains, these new
relationships are overseen by numerous agencies
and take multiple forms, with aid, trade and
investment clearly very much intertwined.
Currently, commercial and state-backed loans
make up the highest levels of funding flows from
China. Recent estimates state China’s Export-
Import Bank alone lent roughly US$67.2 billion
to sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2010
(a sum higher than that of the World Bank),6
whereas highest predictions on Chinese aid
disbursements between 1949 and 2006 have been
estimated to value US$5.6 billion (Davies 2006).
Nevertheless, such aid packages are important as
they are often made up of grants unencumbered
with complex conditionalities, evaluation
frameworks and governance requirements. While
regarded as a ‘social gift to friends’,7 some level of
reciprocity is naturally expected (cf Eyben 2009),
and so it is the wider package of development
cooperation – grants, concessional loans, large-
scale commercial loans and investments, as well
as investments by small-scale private
entrepreneurs – that must be seen in the round.
One of the most high-profile development
cooperation agreements relating to Africa
recently has been the establishment of 20
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Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres
(Hu 2012; Brautigam and Tang 2012). These
centres are aimed to profile Chinese technology
through a partnership agreement with African
governments. They involve the building of a new
research and demonstration centre, often on the
campus of the existing national research
institute, and the staffing and financing of all
operations for three years. The centres are run
by quasi-private companies on behalf of the
Chinese state, and involve intensive training
activities, alongside research and technology
importation and demonstration. Chichava et al.,
Alemu and Scoones, and Mukwereza (this IDS
Bulletin) discuss the establishment of such
centres for Mozambique, Ethiopia and
Zimbabwe respectively. At the UN High Level
Meeting on the MDGs in 2010, China pledged to
establish a further 30 such centres in developing
countries, as well as dispatch 3,000 more
agricultural experts and invite 5,000 agricultural
personnel from those countries (GOC 2011).
While formal ‘aid’ flows (as defined by the OECD-
DAC) remain relatively small, the overall impact
of Chinese engagements in the agricultural sector,
counting in trade, investment and financing, is
substantial and growing (Alden 2013). Financial
figures are hard to come by and difficult to verify,
largely due to the fact that the Chinese state does
not readily publish aid data. Moreover, roughly 80
per cent of Chinese FDI passes through Hong
Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin
Islands, making it hard to track when it ends up in
other regions or sectors (Li and Zheng 2012: 147).
However, China’s Ministry of Information does
reveal that the Chinese state had supported 221
agricultural projects in other developing countries
by 2009 (GOC 2011).
How is this Chinese engagement with African
agriculture framed? One strong line of argument
made by nearly all Chinese commentators is the
importance of agriculture in the Chinese
economic transformation. The figure that China
feeds 20 per cent of the world’s population on
roughly 10 per cent of the world’s arable land, is
repeated again and again (Li et al. 2012: 3; Wang
2010; Brautigam 2009: 234). This, it is argued,
has been possible through a very particular
Chinese path of agrarian transformation, based
on intensification using labour and appropriate
technologies over the course of centuries (Li et al.
2012). In a case study conducted by the China
Agricultural University, they found Chinese
smallholder farmers were able to accrue gross
incomes of US$2,286 per hectare of rice
cultivation compared with Liberia which stands
at US$635 (Li et al. 2012: 193). It was shown that
some variables such as hired labour costs were
roughly the same in both countries, but that the
qualities and quantities of China’s capital and
technological inputs per hectare made the
difference. While being careful not to claim that
such experiences can be transferred wholesale,
Li Xiaoyun and others (2012) argue convincingly
that such experiences can be useful bases for
sharing and learning between China and Africa,
as African agriculture seeks to intensify and
commercialise, given the need to increase food
security and market-based returns.
While the narrative that smallholder-led
agrarian transformation is central holds much
sway in the wider discussion of agricultural
cooperation in Africa, the Chinese experience of
large-scale farming also runs alongside this. The
consolidation of clusters of small-scale farms in
northern China and the creation of massive
large-scale mechanised grain-producing farms is
seen by some as an alternative model (Li et al.
2012), despite the social, economic and
ecological challenges such operations have faced
(Buckley, this IDS Bulletin). Indeed, some of the
quasi-private companies that have taken on the
Chinese Agricultural Technology Demonstration
Centres (ATDCs) across Africa, such as Minoble
in Zimbabwe (Mukwereza, this IDS Bulletin)
have their commercial operations centred on
such farms, with technologies more geared
towards large-scale farming operations, than the
classic small-scale farm enterprises so celebrated
in the smallholder success narrative.
Thus, in the Chinese vision of agriculture for
Africa, competing narratives of Chinese
agricultural success exist side-by-side, both
appropriated by Chinese officials at different
points. What happens on the ground of course
depends on who gets involved and who finances
what. And despite the rhetoric of mutual learning
and political solidarity, commercial interests are
never far from the centre of the engagement.
6 Brazil in Africa
Tensions between competing visions of
agriculture domestically, and different
interpretations of agrarian histories and politics,
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are equally characteristic of the Brazilian
engagements in international development and
frame the nature of cooperation and investment
activities in Africa, as Cabral et al. and Pierri
(this IDS Bulletin) explain.
The rhetoric of Brazilian engagement in Africa,
particularly as promoted by former President,
Lula da Silva, is very much framed in terms of
‘mutual benefit’ and ‘solidarity diplomacy’.
South–South cooperation is central, as Brazil
attempts to reshape diplomatic world order. All
sorts of ‘social imaginaries’ are deployed (see
below), including the values of solidarity based
on a common history of colonialism and the slave
trade, the perceptions of similarity through
shared ancestries, language (in Lusophone
countries), and commitment to liberation and
democracy. For example, Brazil’s President
Dilma Rousseff speaking at the 3rd Africa–South
America Summit (ASA) in Equatorial Guinea, in
February 2013, remarked:
Long gone are the days when we [Africa and
South America] were part of a distant, silent
or silenced, and troublesome periphery…
Brazil and Africa not only have a common
cultural, social and historical root, from the
point of view of our nation… characteristics of
Brazilian agriculture are also present here in
Africa to the extent that our soils share
similarities, our climate shares similarities…8
A particularly resonant social imaginary pertains
to agriculture, centred on the conquest, taming
and transformation of the frontier areas of
Brazil, and perhaps especially the savanna areas
of the Cerrado. Now the centre of massive agri-
business-led commercial production of soya bean
in particular, a well-rehearsed narrative relates
the expansion of such agriculture and the
transformation of a previously backward area
into the core of the Brazilian agricultural
economy. This transformation took place through
the migration of entrepreneurial and skilled
farmers from the south of Brazil, and the
application of home-grown Brazilian
technologies to improve soils and boost
production (Hosono and Hongo 2012). This story
is now portrayed as a model for Africa, and,
despite the Brazilian critiques, of which there
are many (cf Oliveira 2005; Mazzetto Silva 2009),
the idea has taken hold not only within Brazilian
technical cooperation, and especially parts of the
technical agency Embrapa,9 but also among
external experts, media commentators and
African policymakers (The Economist 2010).
The agri-business vision of large-scale
commercial agriculture is also central to the
biofuels story. Ethanol production based on the
expansion of sugar cane cultivation has again
become one of the well-known Brazilian ‘success
stories’. Brazilian technologies, developed by
Embrapa, have been central to this, and
Brazilian sugar cane and ethanol production
companies are some of the most successful in the
world, with increasing ambitions in Africa, as
explained by Alemu and Scoones (this IDS
Bulletin) for Ethiopia.
Yet the agri-business framing of Brazilian
domestic agricultural policy is internally highly
contested, and this is in turn reflected in
development cooperation with Africa. Questions
are raised, for example, about the environmental
impacts of large-scale agriculture, arguing for
lower input ecological systems of agriculture.
Others point to the implications for equity,
including issues of labour rights, of the
concentrations of capital in a few large
businesses, and the impacts on local economies.
Still others raise questions about the long-term
economic viability of such operations, based as
they are on fossil-fuel dependent mechanised
agriculture, and long-distance transport to
markets (Wilkinson et al. 2012; Altieri and Toledo
2011). Similar issues are raised in respect of
cane-based ethanol production for biofuel, with
critics pointing to the massive subsidies and
state support for such agri-business operations,
and contrasting the ethanol strategy with the
more decentralised, locally controlled production
of biodiesel (Wilkinson and Herrera 2010).
As Cabral et al. (this IDS Bulletin) point out, the
decentralised nature of technical cooperation –
whereby specialised Brazilian institutions engage
directly in cooperation activities – means that
there are numerous actors involved in
agricultural development cooperation in Brazil.
They count over 20 institutions, holding a range
of positions in this debate. Without a coherent,
overarching policy framework, and with no firm,
mandated direction for development cooperation
(claimed to be consistent with a demand-driven
rationale), beyond the Brazilian Cooperation
Agency (ABC),10 diverse strands of development
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cooperation emerge, framed by different
domestic political concerns, and informed by
contrasting narratives and interests.
Two main axes are identified, associated with the
two main agriculture and rural development
ministries in Brazil. First, is the agri-business
strand, supported by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA), alongside its
semi-autonomous research corporation,
Embrapa, Brazil’s core agricultural research
agency. Connections between ‘technical
cooperation’ and business interests are
increasingly visible, particularly in the Nacala
corridor in northern Mozambique, where the
technical cooperation programme ProSavana is
paving the way for private investments in agri-
business by Brazilian and Japanese companies
(Chichava et al., this IDS Bulletin).
Second, is the ‘family farming’ perspective
promoted by the Ministry of Agrarian
Development (MDA), the ministry also
responsible for overseeing land reform
settlements, in many ways in opposition to the
agri-business lobby. This narrative was
significantly strengthened during Lula da Silva’s
administration and eventually added into the
international cooperation framework at a
landmark event – the Brazil–Africa Dialogue on
Food Security, the Fight Against Hunger and
Rural Development – hosted by the president
himself in 2010.11 The More Food Africa
programme (recently re-labelled More Food
International) is thus far the MDA’s main
cooperation initiative in Africa, promising to
increase productivity and improve food security
by enhancing small farmers’ access to machinery,
including tractors, in countries like Ghana and
Zimbabwe (Amanor, Mukwereza and Pierri, this
IDS Bulletin).
While the Brazilian idea of ‘small-scale’ family
farming may differ quite radically from what is
found in these African countries (Pierri, this IDS
Bulletin), its focus is definitely less on the
expansion of large-scale commercial operations
with the support of Brazilian agri-business and
technology, and so sits in a sometimes uneasy
tension with other Brazilian engagements.
Brazilian politicians argue that both are central
to the Brazilian way of doing agriculture and
rural development, and so Africa can benefit from
both, but of course this suggests the replication of
a dualistic Brazilian model of agrarian structure
and support in an African context (Cabral et al.
and Pierri, this IDS Bulletin).
The dualism is challenged within Brazil by social
movements and civil society organisations
associated with agrarian reform (such as the
MST, the landless rural workers’ movement) and
ecological agriculture (such as the AS-PTA)12
agendas. The influence of such actors in Brazilian
engagements in Africa is increasingly noticeable,
as for example in the exchange facilitated by Via
Campesina between the MST and Mozambique’s
National Peasants’ Union (UNAC).13
While Brazilian development cooperation in
Africa pales into insignificance alongside Chinese
engagements (Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin),
Brazilian involvement in agriculture is certainly
growing; and is rapidly expanding beyond the
narrow grouping of Lusophone countries where
Brazilian expertise and commerce has
traditionally been present. It is taking a diversity
of forms, including large-scale agri-business
investments, promotion of low-carbon
agricultural technologies, support for smallholder
production (with new subsidised technologies
promoting agricultural mechanisation and input
industries) and food production programmes
linked to school feeding programmes. As a
platform for the expansion of Brazilian
commercial operations, often in trilateral or
multilateral arrangements as in Mozambique’s
ProSavana project, such cooperation agreements
in Africa may well become increasingly
significant. Equally, unlike for China, civil society
engagement may also help shape critique and
alternatives, as new networks are established
between Brazilian and African players.
7 New development encounters: five key questions
Across this huge diversity of development
cooperation activities, labelled variously under
aid, trade and investment, and usually
combinations of each, what are some of the key
features that define how they play out in
practice? As already noted, there is no singular
form of Chinese and Brazilian engagement in
Africa, and each intervention is, in important
respects, different. Competing visions, reflecting
domestic political differences, become mirrored
in the development encounter, and competing
interests and perspectives are continuously being
negotiated. This cannot be reduced to a static
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notion of ‘transfer’ – of money, expertise,
machinery or policy – but one of ‘encounter’,
where knowledge framings and their politics are
constantly being negotiated. Here we outline five
that are central to the discussions in the articles
that follow, and our CBAA research programme
more generally.
7.1 What is the political-economic context for these
development encounters?
New development partnerships with China and
Brazil are being built in relation to particular
needs, challenges and demands. These must be
in understood in terms of the particular contexts
and histories of ‘recipient’ countries.
As discussed earlier, and as elaborated in more
depth by Kojo Amanor (this IDS Bulletin) in his
critique of South–South cooperation framings,
the types of intervention we are seeing today
must be understood in terms of the longer-term
transformations of national agrarian political
economies through economic reform and market
liberalisation, both in Africa, but also in China
and Brazil. Such reforms have opened up the
opportunities for agri-business, particularly if
this is facilitated by aid programmes. While for a
(short) period, Western aid has, at least
rhetorically, eschewed ‘tied aid’, linked to
commercial opportunities, this imperative has
declined, particularly as ‘support for the private
sector’ and ‘business-led growth’ has become
more central to the development mantra.14 In
this sense, in the post-adjustment period of
liberalised economies, with the emphasis on
growth, the political economy of aid and
investment is increasingly intertwined. Amanor
argues China and Brazil are therefore not so
different to Western countries, and all compete
within a market-based, global economy for the
potential riches to be found in the newly
liberalised, vibrant economies on the African
continent. The difference perhaps is that the
model of capitalism offered by China and Brazil
is underpinned by strong state intervention, an
approach welcomed by many African
governments, only now recovering from the
effects of structural adjustment.
Thus, in his article on Ghana, Amanor (this IDS
Bulletin) argues that Chinese and Brazilian
investments must be seen in the light of this
particular history of liberalisation, and the
South–South cooperation gloss should not deflect
us from a more hard-nosed political economy
analysis. In the same way, technical cooperation
should be seen in historical perspective. In his
other article on South–South cooperation,
Amanor (this IDS Bulletin) outlines how, through
the support given by US foundations from the
1960s, and the extensive international
networking in scientific cooperation through the
CGIAR, scholarship programmes in US and
European universities, and networks built
through disciplinary and other professional
associations, there is a remarkable overlap
between US, European, Brazilian and even
Chinese technical expertise networks in Africa.
This suggests that the interventions from China
or Brazil are less new than sometimes supposed,
and more a continuation of the networks of
support, and associated framings, that have
existed since the 1960s and the promulgation of
a ‘green revolution’ in Africa. Professional elites
in Africa are very much part of these networks,
have studied in the same universities, are
members of the same professional associations
and have worked in the same international
institutes. While formerly Soviet, and to some
extent Chinese, educational support offered a
different trajectory for previous generations,
there is a greater homogeneity in elite scientific
networks today, resulting in a greater
convergence in scientific and technical advice,
although perhaps some divergences, for example
around positions on intellectual property rights.
7.2 What relationships are being built on?
Engagements in Africa are, as we have noted, not
entirely new. They build on often long-term
relationships, shaped in previous eras by political
elites. Chinese support for liberation struggles,
and close associations with new political elites in
post-independent African countries, have
influenced relationships since; especially where
the same person has remained in power for many
years, as in President Mugabe in Zimbabwe for
instance.
The struggle against colonialism, and the
resistance to the depredations of Western capital
and its shadow, the aid industry, is central to the
rhetorical underpinnings of the relationships. Of
course, more pragmatically, the real discussions
are about money, investments, and financing
deals, but these can be dressed up and
legitimised in other ways.
IDS Bulletin Volume 44  Number 4  July 2013 11
1 Scoones IDSB44.4.qxd  18/06/2013  14:54  Page 11
Brazil makes great play of its cultural, historical
and linguistic affinities in Africa, as already
discussed. The international diplomatic initiatives
by former President Lula da Silva provided a
platform for these arguments, and on multiple
visits the importance of solidarity, mutual
learning and South–South cooperation was
emphasised. However, such rhetoric is starting to
look like an entry point for a more concrete
discussion about commercial opportunities for
Brazilian businesses, a theme central to his less
flamboyant successor in the presidency, Dilma
Rousseff (Costa Leite forthcoming).
Of course, in the context of the global discussion
of the ‘rising powers’ and the positioning of the
BRICS as a bloc, part of the G20, allied to the
G77, and often invited into the inner circle at the
G8, Brazilian and Chinese diplomacy sees
alliances with Africa as key, pushing for a place
at the high table. Brazil’s nomination for the UN
FAO Director General post was clearly assisted
by African alliances (Pierri, this IDS Bulletin), as
is continued African support for the ‘One China’
policy or China’s positions at the UN. African aid
and investment are very much part of these high-
level diplomatic manoeuvres, although played
out in very different styles by Brazil and China.
7.3 What perceptions and political interests underlie
these development encounters?
As we have discussed earlier, new development
cooperation engagements in Africa are
fundamentally shaped by historical experiences
and domestic debates and politics. Particular
‘social imaginaries’ – the set of values,
institutions, and symbols common to a particular
social group and society – can be very powerful in
framing narratives of intervention (Taylor 2004).
These may derive from particular stories of
success and certain culturally informed
perceptions of history, ecology and ‘progress’ in
development. Imaginaries often juxtapose a
vision of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ with one
of backwardness and need, and so project a view
of what the future should be. It is not as if such
imaginaries are untrue or somehow illegitimate,
but the point is that they become powerful in
particular settings, defining identities and
positions, and so narratives of what to do. This
has an impact on development cooperation, in
the ways we have already described for Brazil
and China, just as they do for the UK, the USA
or elsewhere.
By identifying such social imaginaries, and
locating them in situated historical experiences,
we are able to understand how particular visions
are portrayed and pushed. But they may not be
singular: different imaginaries, and so policy
narratives, may compete with each other,
reflecting divided political positions, and different
cultural and social identifications. This is certainly
the case in relation to visions of agriculture pushed
by both China and Brazil (Chichava et al., this IDS
Bulletin). Different narratives exist, contrasting
large-scale, mechanised commercial agriculture
with smallholder, local, family-oriented farming in
both cases. And with each come different ‘models’
of what successful agriculture should be, who
farmers are, and what an appropriate reordered
ecology should look like to encompass such a
landscape vision. As background assumptions,
informed by powerful cultural symbols and
resonant metaphors, these are in turn translated
into the negotiations around cooperation and
investment activity in Africa.
7.4 How are negotiations on agreements carried out?
Our focus on the ‘development encounter’
emphasises the knowledges and practices involved
in negotiation processes (cf Lewis and Mosse 2006;
Mosse 2005; Long and Long 1992). Such
negotiations may well be between unequal parties,
with gradients of power skewed in one direction.
They may be heavily constrained by structural
features of the relationship embedded in unequal
international relations and power structures. But
nevertheless these are not passive encounters,
where agency cannot be expressed and articulated.
Indeed a growing literature emphasises the
importance of ‘African agency’ (Mohan and
Lampert 2013; Brown 2012), whereby states are
able to gain advantage, despite unequal power
relationships through exercising influence.
There is always some room for manoeuvre, and
in such encounters, both parties need each other
to some extent (Carmody and Taylor 2010). This
perspective challenges the idea that the ‘rising
powers’ are always the ‘drivers’, Asian or
otherwise (cf Kaplinsky and Morris 2009a). Such
perspectives, often focusing on economic
relationships shaped by trade, sometimes forget
that relationships are conditioned by political
negotiations, and so social and political agency.
To understand how such negotiations are played
out, we must first look at how needs and
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priorities from both parties are framed, and
assess the political configuration of interests
involved. In bilateral negotiations between
states, there are always multiple interests at
play, as states are far from homogeneous entities.
The same applies to capital. It makes a big
difference when considering a large, well-
connected multinational firm, a state-controlled
firm based in a Chinese province or a small-scale
migrant business entrepreneur. Unpacking the
diverse interests of capital is essential if we are
to understand the contours of the negotiation
(Gu 2009, 2011).
Thus in relation to the four country cases
discussed in this IDS Bulletin, what are the
dynamics at play? In the aftermath of a major
land reform and diplomatic and economic
isolation by the Western community, the
Zimbabwean state was in urgent need of
assistance outside the standard Western aid
framework. This has provided opportunities for
both Brazil and China, as Mukwereza (this IDS
Bulletin) describes, allowing Zimbabwe to subvert
‘sanctions’ imposed by the West, but also
providing opportunities for Brazilian and
Chinese business at the same time.
In the Ghanaian and Mozambican cases
(Amanor, and Chichava et al., this IDS Bulletin),
the need to promote agri-business growth was
central to government policy, and aligned to
national elite interests. A liberalised, pro-market
policy promoted by Western interests provided a
firm basis for investment by China and Brazil in
both countries, supported by the bilateral ‘aid’
elements of their cooperation programmes.
Again there was mutual advantage at play, with
state and commercial elites benefiting locally
from investments by external agri-businesses,
who were able to establish themselves under
preferential terms.
As Alemu and Scoones (this IDS Bulletin) observe
for the case of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian state has
exerted substantial agency in trading off
different aid and investment opportunities, in
order to pursue its ‘developmental state’
objectives. Aiming to follow the lead of East
Asian countries, Ethiopia has followed what
Kelsall (2013, following Crook 1989) terms
‘developmental patrimonialism’, whereby close
personal control by state and party elites, and
involving quasi-private commercial entities, have
directed, channelled and controlled investments
to developmental ends, with apparently limited
corruption. Here, Chinese investments in
infrastructure, including roads and large dams,
have been seen as supportive to agricultural
growth, as has the facilitation of Brazilian
investment in the sugar cane and ethanol
production sector.
With multiple ‘aid’ agencies, commercial and
development banks, and external investors, as
companies but also in the form of a range of
funds and other instruments, all clamouring for
part of the action, African states do have
opportunities to exert their agency, and guide
negotiations in their favour, if they play their
cards right. Ethiopia, with a strong bureaucracy
and with tight party control of state agencies, and
many private sector operations too, along with
the charismatic leadership of the now late Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi, has been able to manage
this process very effectively, with evident results,
if aggregate growth figures are taken as an
indicator (Alemu and Scoones, this IDS Bulletin).
7.5 What project-level interactions occur that shape
development encounters?
While agency may be exerted at the broad level
of inter-governmental negotiations around
cooperation agreements, there are also more
micro-level negotiations which play out when a
project is unfolding on the ground. These may be
just as important as the higher-level agreement
in shaping the direction and outcome of an
intervention.
At the micro level, the broader discourses which
are so influential in framing the wider
development debate may be less significant. In
the day-to-day interactions between scientists,
technicians and government officials, a range of
other factors come into play. The actual practices
embedded in a cooperation project may be quite
mundane, but may be conditioned by
misunderstandings over language, over accepted
procedure, and cultural misperceptions about
what is good practice, hard work or excellent
results. For in cooperation projects it is not only
the wider ‘social imaginaries’ which shape
cultural understandings more broadly that are
imported, but also the routine bureaucratic
practices of governmental or commercial
operations, the social and cultural values and
practices of individuals and the perceptions of
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‘the other’, as reinforced by cultural biases, the
media and other experiences.
This, of course, works both ways, and the
development encounter becomes framed by all
these aspects. As Lila Buckley (2013) outlines in
relation to a Chinese development cooperation
project in Senegal, a whole series of
misunderstandings and misperceptions arose,
influenced by racialised stereotyping and failure
to communicate. The result, in the end, was a
separation of operational activities between the
Chinese and Senegalese, accepting difference
and realising that an integrated joint activity, no
matter what the official rhetoric was, was not
going to work.
Project-based encounters can thus be read as part
of a ‘performance’, and development
interventions as ‘performative’ acts (cf Desai
2006). Through such performances, the drama of
development encounters is played out, with actors
playing different roles. Questions of power and
authority are central, leading to a variety of
outcomes as negotiations progress: from
agreement, consent and compliance to reshaping,
resistance and renegotiation. There is a
particular role for expertise, especially accredited
scientific expertise, in such encounters. Science
appeals to a sense of universalism: that models
can be applied in new places, that technologies
will work in new settings, and that projects will
unfold according to the scientific plans devised.
Techno-science is therefore associated with
practices or ordering, creating legibility and
defining rules (Mitchell 2002; Scott 1998), each
frequently bound up with processes of state
planning and control as part of development’s
modernising and civilising project (Li 2007).
Yet all expertise is ultimately located and local,
despite its global, universalistic claims, and local
contexts where scientific plans unfold have the
habit of challenging the authority of techno-
scientific impositions, whether through unruly
people resisting or unruly ecologies not playing
by the rule-book. Contingency, chance and
uncertainty represent the dynamics of the real
world. As neat, techno-scientific plans get
implemented, they are handed over to
technicians, labourers, extension workers and
implementation agents who have to broker
different compromises in the real world. It is
these ‘encounters at the interface’ (Long and van
der Ploeg 1989) between science and practice,
policy and implementation where the
negotiations around what actually happens take
place. And it is these brokering, negotiation and
translation processes that become central to
understanding how new forms of development
cooperation happen in practice.
8 A new paradigm for development cooperation?
Each of the articles that follow in this IDS Bulletin
picks up on these themes in different ways. We
are interested in the cultural and social framings
that influence the development encounter, and in
particular the knowledge politics that underlie
these. We are also interested in the broad
political-economic contexts and structural power
relations that influence what happens where and
why. Through a more comparative approach, we
gain an insight into the importance of context,
and the role of individuals, bureaucracies and
historical experiences in shaping the form new
cooperation engagements take place. And finally,
we are also interested in the practices and the
micro-politics of such engagements, and how
individuals – as officials, scientists, or farmers –
bring with them ideas, experiences and biases
into the encounter, which require negotiation,
and ultimately shape the outcomes.
In many respects, the repositioning of these
players on the scene in Africa has opened up the
development game. The old, narrow
conditionalities are being questioned, as African
governments do not need to be behoven to the
strictures of Western development aid. Yet,
engagement always comes with strings attached,
as indeed suggested by the ‘mutual benefit’
proposition, despite the warm-sounding rhetoric
of ‘South–South cooperation’ and ‘solidarity
diplomacy’. China and Brazil need Africa, just as
Africa needs them. Africa’s resources, including
its land, are critical both for longer-term global
food security, particularly in the populous parts
of Asia, and such low-cost resources, labour and
market connections are vital for agri-business
and trade plans.
But is all this new activity ushering in a ‘new
paradigm’ of development cooperation, as some
have suggested? As we have seen, the new
relationships being forged by Brazil and China
are certainly different in some important
respects, but are they that new? They are
certainly layered on past experiences. Western
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donors are changing too and, despite the claims,
their aid has never been completely untied,
philanthropic giving. It has always been bound
up with geopolitical positioning and national
benefit, whether explicit or not. The interests of
capital have always been important in aid policy,
and now with the discourse about the private
sector’s role in development, this has once again
become more prominent. Whether in the context
of ‘the war on terror’ or the market expansion of
business interests, development cooperation
must always be viewed in the context of a wider
political economy with deep historical roots. The
same of course applies to the ‘rising powers’.
Today with more aid donors, ‘development
partners’ and investors on the scene, there is
perhaps the possibility for greater pragmatism
and realism and less of a push towards uniformity
and harmonisation, and so better possibilities for
negotiation by African governments between
competing offers. However, there may be
downsides of such an opening up of opportunities.
With the more lax code of conduct for
development cooperation that emerged at the
Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in
2011, there may be less protection for recipients,
and, as in the past, greater chance for duplication
and incoherence in development interventions.
Furthermore, fears of unconditional aid
undermining good governance have been voiced
(Kragelund 2010), as have concerns that the
offloading of excess capital in the form of cheap
loans will result in the accumulation of debt
burdens in Africa (Manning 2006).
This IDS Bulletin explores these issues through a
series of African country cases, complemented by
reviews of Brazil’s and China’s development
cooperation and agricultural policy frameworks.
It provides a reflection on what is happening in
the very particular context of agriculture, a
sector central to Africa’s development effort.
This emerging field of research continues largely
unexplored and we hope the insights developed
here can be used to unpack and interrogate
further the emerging ‘development encounters’,
and pose new questions for further work.
There are two areas that require most additional
study in particular. One concerns the domestic
dynamics, within Brazil and China, shaping
cooperation policies and particularly agricultural
development models on offer. Most of the
literature has been looking at the engagements
of the ‘rising powers’ in development from an
international relations perspective, concerned
with geopolitics, but overlooking the domestic
political economy. By tracing Brazil and China’s
own agricultural trajectories, policy debates and
political battles, we can better comprehend the
narratives and imaginaries of development being
deployed in Africa.
The other is a focus on the detailed ‘knowledge
encounters’ in the field, where project and
investment plans are defined, and implementation
unfolds. This has barely been discussed in the
wider literature on Brazil and China in Africa,
and in this IDS Bulletin, the details are only
touched upon. In the next phase of our research,
through a more in-depth, ethnographic
assessment of different projects and investments,
we will gain some wider understanding of this
dynamic. Only then will we be able to go beyond
the rhetoric and assess whether a new
development paradigm is emerging, or whether
we have just more of the same.
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